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' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. SEAL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
CARPETS, INCORPORATED, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and .Appellant. 
Case 
No.10333 
BRIEF O,F APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
In the lower Court, this action was brought by plain-
tiff to recover on an open account assigned to plaintiff 
for collection by a Colorado corporation, doing business 
as G. & P. Distributing Company, in the amount of 
$5,493.05 plus interest. (R-1) Defendant admitted the 
account and by way of affirmative defense alleged that 
the goods and merchandise giving rise to the open account 
furnished by plaintiff's assignor were defective; and by 
reason of said defects, defendant was damaged in ex-
cess of plaintiff's claim. (R-2 and R-3) In its Answer, 
def en<lant specifically alleged damage additionally to its 
business reputation from loss of good will, etc. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
The matter was tried before the Court without jury, 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson presiding, on February 2, 
1965. The Court rendered Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff on 
its undisputed claim and allowed an offset to the de-
fendant in the amount of $1,625.00. (R-6, R-7) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, subsequent to the trial, moved the Court 
to amend its Findings and further moved for a New 
Trial. Said motions were made pursuant to stipulation 
of counsel and leave granted by the Court, orally rather 
than in writing, and argued February 19, 1965. Said mo-
tions were denied by the Court. (R-136) During the 
course of the trial, defendant sought to introduce par-
ticular evidence relating to damages which, upon objec-
tion by plaintiff's counsel, was excluded by the Court. 
From the judgment of the Court, the denial of the motions 
above noted and for other errors which defendant main-
tains were committed during the trial, defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime in October or November of 1962, plaintiff's 
assignor, G. & P. Distributing Company (hereafter re-
ferred to as G. & P.) through a sales representative, 
one Don Liston, made contact with Mr. William Thomp-
son, secretary and salesman of defendant corporation, 
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for the purpose of selling to defendant carpeting. (R-16 
and R-109) Liston had with him samples and other ad-
yertising paraphernalia and quoted prices to Thompson 
at the time, leaving some of the samples with him. (R-17 
and R-18) Defendant was, at the time, bidding and at-
tempting to retail carpeting to a United Homes, Incorpo-
rated, which company was constructing 36 apartments in 
a series of six buildings located on 33rd South and ap-
proximately 21st East in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R-17-19) 
Defendant furnished said United Homes with a bid on 
the apartment job based upon the prices quoted by Lis-
ton and furnished United Homes with samples supplied 
hy Liston. (R-18) United Homes contracted to pur-
chase approximately 2200 yards of said carpeting; and 
defendant, in turn, ordered the same from G. & P. The 
order was placed ·with G. & P. sometime in early Novem-
hPr of 1962. (R-43 and R-44) 
William Thompson testified that attached to the sam-
ples later delivered to United Homes was a printed war-
ranty, warranting the carpet against defective work-
manship and wear for a period of five years, with the 
exception of stairways. (R-20-22) The witness further 
indicated his efforts to reobtain from United Homes the 
samples with the warranty attached, which he testified 
he had attempted to get up to and including the day be-
fore the trial vvithout success. (R-21) The existence of 
the warranty and its terms were corroborated by Mr. 
Claude Thompson, president of defendant corporation 
(and, incidentally, father of William C. Thompson, the 
previous witness). (R-88) 
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Mr. V. B. Witherell, President of G. & P., denied 
the existence of any such warranty categorically. (R-112) 
On cross-examination, Witherell admitted, however, that 
he had no direct knowledge as to what warranty his sales-
man, Liston, had made nor what written warranty, if any, 
was attached to the samples furnished by Liston to de-
fendant. (R-112-113) On further cross-examination, he 
admitted that without a written guarantee that ''all mills 
guarantee satisfaction in workmanship and materials, 
but no written guarantee certificate." (R-115) He was 
then asked if such guarantee related to the manufacture 
of the carpet furnished United Homes and he answered 
in the affirmative. Witherell, incidentally, further admitted 
that the salesman, Liston, was in his employ a matter of 
four months, leaving G. & P. sometime in December of 
1962. (R-109-110) 
Following the placement of the order for the carpet, 
it was delivered sporadically in varying and assorted 
roll sizes to defendant, beginning in November and con-
tinuing through January 20, 1963. (R-23) The rolls var-
ied in length from 30 feet to 140 feet; and the witness, 
William Thompson, indicated which rolls and what 
lengths arrived in which months. (R-26-29, See also Ex-
hibit D-6) Said deliveries occasioned difficulty between 
defendant and its purchaser noted by Exhibits D-4 and 
D-5. (R-30-31) 
William Thompson was asked if he encountered dif-
ficulties with United by virtue of the sporadic deliveries, 
and the court interpolated the question "delays you 
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mean.'' There was then a discussion by counsel with 
the court thereafter concerning the admissibility of 
evidence relative to loss of time from delay and damages 
therefor to which plaintiff's counsel objected. The court 
permitted defendant's counsel to make a proffer of proof 
and then ordered that such an inquiry into such an area 
was not permissible. The court did permit the intro-
duction of said Exhibits D-4 and D-5 solely for their ref-
erences to defects while refusing to consider the portions 
of each which related to delay and damages resulting 
therefrom. 
The witness William Thompson further testified that 
the defendant took a loss on the installation for United 
Homes which he originally understood was $3,125.00, the 
contract price being $13,125.00, and what he understood 
the final settlement to be of $10,000.00. (R-33) On cross-
examination, he was asked if the amount finally settled 
with United Homes was $11,500.00 rather than $10,000.00, 
and he indicated the record would have to be checked; 
(R-38) at which point counsel for the defendant ex-
plained to the court that defendant had attempted to lo-
cate the settlement check from United Homes without 
success and that it had not been obtained. Counsel for 
plaintiff was, later during the trial, able to produce a 
copy of the check in issue in the amount of $11,500.00 
which was by stipulation received in evidence as Ex-
hibit P-10. (R-50 and R-69) 
The witness Claude Thompson testified about 
the final settlement with United Homes and, as 
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part of said settlement, in addition to taking the loss, 
whether a warranty was required to be furnished by him 
to United Homes. His answers were that such a war-
ranty was furnished of necessity and that it ran for a 
period of three years. (R-52) 
This witness was further asked about conversations 
with -Witherell relative to the United Homes job and 
complaints in connection with it. He was also asked 
the particulars in which the carpet delivered differed 
from the samples originally furnished and what de-
fects he noted. His observations and testimony will be 
cited in greater detail hereafter. This witness' testi-
mony concerning his losses by virtue of the defective 
material furnished will also be quoted at length sub-
sequently. 
Defendant called Kenneth P. Campman, the manager 
of the apartment house, who testified in connection ·with 
cleaning and maintenance of the carpeting and indicated 
that approximately half the time the carpets in issue were 
cleaned by him and the other half the time he contracted 
to have it done professionally. (R-92) When asked about 
his observations of the carpeting and its condition, he 
indicated it was in some instances in fair condition but 
in other instances in such poor condition as to make the 
units with such carpeting difficult to rent. When asked 
to be specific, he said: 
''A. Rugs will sometime fray quite a bit. In 
much carpet there is real little - kind of worn 
bare, and in other cases it is just discolored. Yon 
can work on it and work on it. I know a number 
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of the tenants who have complained about how 
difficult they are to keep clean, and they just can't 
keep them clean.'' ( 93) 
Plaintiff called, on its behalf, Mr. V. B. Witherell, 
known as Whitey Witherell. This witness asserted that, 
while he had inspected the United Homes job only the 
clay before the trial (R-10), he insisted there were no 
defects in the carpet. (R-104) This opinion was based 
upon an inspection of" six or seven apartments." (R-105) 
This witness further admitted having notice of com-
plaints relative to the quality of the carpet as early as 
August of 1963 (R-98-R-99). He further acknowledged 
receiving the formal notice of defects in a letter from 
counsel for defendant (admitted in evidence as Exhibit 
D-8) (R-117) which bears the date of October 22, 1963. 
Accompanying Mr. Witherell on said inspection was 
a Clifford Heaps, an employee of Service Master, In-
corporated, which is a furniture and carpet cleaning 
business. This Mr. Heaps, when called to testify, indi-
cated that the units inspected were :five and six (R-121); 
and he observed that some carpets had been "pilling or 
fuzzing up." (R-122) He admitted that such pilling, 
if the carpet was "continuous filament" nylon, would be 
a defect. He then admitted that the carpet in issue 
was "supposed to be continuous :filament" nylon. (R-128) 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in the following particulars : 
(A) IN PREVENTING DEFENDAN'l1 
FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE REGARD-
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ING DELAY IN DELIVERY AND IN PRE-
VENTING EVIDENCE FROM BEING INTRO-
DUCED TO SHOW DEFENDANT'S LOSS OF 
BUSINESS AND FUTURE PROFITS. 
(B) THE JUDGMEN'11 DID NOT CON-
FORM TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED. 
At the outset, defendant-appellant wishes to ack-
nowledge that the trial court did apparently adopt de-
fendant's position in granting an offset to it, and def end-
ant-appellant has no quarrel with the court's conduct in 
that connection but claims error in that the court below 
did not consistently adopt defendant's full position; nor 
did it go far enough in permitting and considering evi-
dence of offset legitimately arising out of the facts of 
this case. 
(A) IN PREVENTING DEFENDANT 
FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE REGARD-
ING DELAY IN DELIVERY AND IN PRE-
VENTING EVIDENCE FROM BEING INTRO-
DUCED TO SHOW DEFENDANT'S LOSS OF 
BUSINESS AND FUTURE PROFITS. 
The witness, William Thompson, testified that at 
the time the original order to G. & P. was made, a dead-
line of December 31 for delivery was imperative. The 
questions and answers are as follows: 
'' Q. And in that connection was there any dis-
cussion - was there any discussion "\vi th '11om -
THE CouRT : ''Don.'' 
MR. MADSEN: ''Don.'' Excuse me. Thank you, 
your Honor. 
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Q. (By 1'1R. MADSEN) Relating to the time of 
delivery, or the nature of this particular order1 
A. It was specified in our bid we would be 
completed approximately the 31st of December, 
and he was pushing, trying to get his units com-
pleted so he could rent them. They are not mak-
ing too much money when they are empty. 
Q. Mr. Sorensen, you are referring to1 
A. So this urgency was impressed upon Don, 
that these rolls had to be here, and we would have 
delivery of said-" (R. 24) 
Then following his testimony of the extended period 
of delivery running through January 20, with its ac-
companying difficulties. The record shows as follows: 
"Q. Now, let me hand you what has been 
marked- Did you encounter difficulties with your 
customer by virtue of these deliveries? 
THE CouRT : Delays, you mean? 
MR. HANSEN: I am going to object to this as 
being beyond the issues of this answer. 
THE CouRT : You don't set this forth in your 
answer. 
MR. MADSEN: We will have to amend it. We 
talk a bout our damages by virtue of the carpet-
ing material, and if that isn't broad enough we 
would like to include the manner in which it was 
delivered, as well as the quality of the material. 
THE CouRT: The rules provide you have to 
do that within 5 days. 
MR. MADSEN: I think it is probative, your 
Honor. It goes to the total problem. Let me 
make a proffer of proof, and then if you wish to 
object-
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MR. HANSEN: I would object to any proof 
being made on that point. 
THE CouRT: He is going to make the proffer at 
this time. 
1\iR. MADSEN: I point out, and referring to this 
delivery matter, your Honor, it runs to the ques-
tion of the difficulty that my clients subsequently 
had in the matter of collections of their account, 
and further the resulting damage of their being 
unable to continue business on further installations 
with this same customer. It relates indirectly to 
the total product furnished. It is a matter of 
when as well as what. 
The letters I was about to introduce relate both 
to the quality of the carpet, as well as to the mat-
ters of the delays of installation, and we are point-
ing out the fact that the delay ·was in large meas-
ure the plaintiff's assignor's responsibility and 
problem, that totally and accumulatively vrns in-
volved in the loss that we sustained in the matter, 
and indirectly the present problem and loss that 
we are now facing yet, and we claim a loss. 
We refer then generally to the word "defec-
tive" in our pleading. If that isn't broad enough 
in our pleading we would like leave to amend. I 
don't believe it is a matter of surprise or notice. 
The facts are as certainly in the plaintiff's knovvl-
edge as ours. 
MR. HANSEN: It is certainly a matter of sur-
prise, your Honor. We came to defend on one 
proposition. 
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THE CouRT: The Pretrial Order limits it to 
that. I will accept your proffer and sustain his 
objection. 
MR. MADSEN : We will introduce most of these 
exhibits for the limited field of the quality in the 
carpet. 
THE CouRT: I will receive the matter of de-
livery over Mr. Hansen's objection, so if you de-
cide to appeal the record will be complete. 
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (By MR. MADSEN) Mr. Thompson, do you, 
in the course of your business, supervise the cor-
respondence and the other related documents you 
receive, in the course of your business~ 
A. The majority of them, yes. 
Q. I hand you what has been marked "Exhib-
it 4." 
THE CouRT : "Exhibit D-4." 
(The document referred to was marked, "Ex-
hibit D-4," for identification.) 
Q. (By MB. MADSEN) And ask you if in fact 
the original letter was received in your office~ 
A. Yes, it was. 
1\1R. MADSEN : Counsel, this is a carbon, but if 
you would, to take the carbon given to me rather 
than the original received by my client, and if we 
can put it in with this witness, I would rather 
do so. 
1\fa. HANSEN : Why don't you just furnish the 
original~ 
1\b. MADSEN: We have tried to locate the orig-
inal at the defendant's place of business ·without 
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success. If we find the original we will insert it 
in place of the carbon. 
MR. HANSEN: He has testified he received the 
original of this? 
MR. 1\1ADSEN : Yes. 
1\fR. HANSEN: But it isn't the original of this? 
l\b. MADSEN : Yes. 
MR. HANSEN: No objection. 
MR. MADSEN : Thank you. 
THE CouRT: It will be received. 
(The document, previously marked ''Exhibit 
D-4," for identification, was received in evidence.) 
MR. HANSEN: This is, of course, subject to the 
objection we made on it? 
THE CouRT : Yes. 
Q. (By MR. MADSEN) I hand you document 
D-5, and ask you if that was received in the course 
of business? 
(The document ref erred to was marked ''Ex-
hibit D-5,'' for identification.) 
A. Yes, it was. 
MR. HANSEN: We make the same objection, 
it is not within the issues, your Honor. 
THE CouRT: Subject to that objection it will 
be received for the purpose of making the record 
complete. 
(The document referred to was marked "Ex-
hibit D-5,'' for identification was received in evi-
dence.)" (R-28-R-31.) 
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Exhibits D-4 and D-5, therefore, were admitted solely 
for the purpose of making the record complete, rather 
than running to the issue of delay and damages there-
from. This court will note that Exhibit D-4 (a letter 
from United Homes' attorney, David West) in its first 
paragraph cancels United's order for the carpeting in is-
sue and points out in the second paragraph that such 
cancellation is because of delay in delivery. Exhibit 
D-5, also, in its first two paragraphs concerns itself with 
delay and the second sentence of the third paragraph 
alone refers to quality in the following language: ''Also, 
you have not put the same quality carpet in the apart-
ments that you showed me.'' Clearly, defendant's cus-
tomer, as well as the defendant, were concerned as much 
·with time of delivery as with the quality of the carpet; 
mid both were subsequently alleged in defendant's an-
swer herein (R-2 and R-3) and speci:fially therein the 
defendant alleged loss of future business and good will 
of the customer. The witness William Thompson was 
later asked if his company had done any subsequent 
business with United Homes as follows: 
'' Q. Have you had any further opportunity to 
install carpet for United Homes subsequently? 
A. No. 
Q. When this job was originally bid, was that 
a possibility? 
A. Very possible. 
MR. HANSEN: I am going to object to that as 
being speculative. 
THE CouRT: The objection will be sustained. 
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JYIR. MADSEN: I think it goes to the question of 
possible future business and loss to him, your 
Honor. 
J\fR. HANSEN: Same objection. 
THE CouRT: Objection sustained." (R-35 and 
R-36.) 
The only other reference to continued business with 
United Homes got into the record obliquely from the 
testimony of Claude Thompson as follows: 
"A. Well, at that time we had taken quite a loss 
on this Sorensen job, and these contract jobs you 
take at a very close margin anyway, and even if 
everything comes out as you planned, very often 
you sustain a loss rather than a profit. And in 
this case this United Homes were in the process 
of building a great quantity of these apartment 
houses around the country, and I gave my own 
bill-'' 
At this point, counsel for plaintiff interrupted. (R-54 
and R-55) 
While the undersigned is aware that speculative 
and unknown damages are not admissible in an action 
for breach of contract, still, estimated future profits are 
recoverable if, in fact, competent evidence is introduced 
to provide a sufficient basis to show their certainty. 
Hence, the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, para-
graph 331, provides : 
"(1) Damages are recoverable for losses caused 
or for profits and other gains prevented by the 
breach only to the extent that the evidence affords 
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a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in 
money with reasonable certainty." 
In this vein is the following citation from 15 Am. 
Jur., damages ~ 150: 
"But it must be borne in mind that since porfits 
are prospective they must, to some extent, be un-
certain and problematical, and so, on that account 
or on account of the difficulties in the way· of 
proof, a person complaining of breach of contract 
cannot be deprived of all remedy, and uncertainty 
merely as to the amount of profits that would have 
been made does not prevent a recovery. The law 
does not require absolute certainty of data upon 
which lost profits are to estimated, but all that is 
required is such reasonable certainty that dam-
ages may not be based wholly upon speculation 
and conjecture, and it is sufficient if there is a 
certain standard or fixed method by which profits 
sought to be recovered may be estimated and de-
termined with a fair degree of accuracy. It has 
been said that the most definite rule that can be 
drawn from the cases would seem to be that if 
by any chance or under any condition of affairs 
then existing the profits might not have accrued 
though the wrongful act had not intervened, there 
can be no allowance of profits lost as damages ; 
but if, except for the wrongful act, there must 
have been profits notwithstanding any other cir-
cumstances existing at the time of the perpetra-
tion of the wrong, the question of their specula-
tiveneess and contingency is absolutely negatived. 
It is usually the right of the innocent party to 
prove the nature of his contract, the circumstances 
surrounding and following its breach, and the 
consequences naturally and plainly traceable to 
it, and then it is for the jury, under proper in-
structions as to the rules of damages, to deter-
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mine the compensation to be awarded for the 
breach.'' 
Cited by way of footnote to the above paragraph is 
the case of Anvil Mining Company v. Humble, 153 U. S. 
540, 38 L. Ed. 814, 14 S. Ct. 876, and an L.R.A. Annotation, 
1915 B, 114. Refusal to permit any such evidence as re-
quested in the proffer above noted, defendant-appellant 
maintains, was error and unduly restricted defendant i11 
attempting to show its losses resulting directly and proxi-
mately from G. & P.'s conduct. 
(B) THE JUDGMENT DID NOT CONFORM 
TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED. 
Defendant-appellant maintains that the controlling 
law in this fact situation was enunciated by this court 
in the case of J. Seal v. Carpets, Incorporated, 13 Utah 
2nd 147, 369 Pac. 2nd 493 (1162). The cited case involved 
the same two parties presently before the court today but 
arose out of a different fact situation; however, it still 
bears some striking similarities to those before the court 
in this action. In the cited case, plaintiff was suing on 
an open account for an out-of-state assignor, which as-
signor was in the carpet wholesaling business. Such are 
the facts here. 
Further in the cited case there was a third party 
importer also involved, which is not the case here; and 
there was a fourth party, Factor-Collection Agency, not 
present here. There are two other major distinctions 
between the facts of the former case and those present 
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here. They are: In the cited case, plaintiff-assignor's 
sales agent inspected the installation of the carpet in de-
fendant's customers' homes and gave direct repeated 
assurances to defendant that such defective carpet would 
be replaced or that defendant would be indemnified there-
for. In the facts before the bar, plaintiff's assignor's 
agent made only one inspection of the United Homes in-
stallation, the day before the trial, and insisted that the 
carpeting was not defective. Also, in the cited case de-
fendant had actually incurred expenditures for replace-
ment of defective carpet, while in the case at bar, he 
gave only testimony as to what is anticipated will be 
necessary to expend to replace the defective carpeting. 
In all other material particulars, the cases are congruent. 
The opinion of this court, written by Justice Henriod 
reads: 
''There appears ample, sufficient, substantial, 
competent and believable evidence, viewed favor-
ably for defendant, to support the trial court's 
conclusion.'' 
The second memorandum decision of Judge Hanson, 
<lated February 19, 1965, in which defendant's motions 
to amend and ask for a new trial were denied, reads in 
part as follows : 
''The court, after viewing the premises, was of 
the opinion that any lay person, by examining 
the rugs in question, could determine that the 
rug in the easterly portion of the buildings was 




"The rug in the easterly apartment, which had 
been referred to as "pilling," was not of the same 
quality as the other rugs, and the Court had no 
way of adjusting between the parties the differ-
ence between the value thereof, and thus afforded 
the defendant an offset in the sum of $1,625.00, 
which was the amount that defendant claimed it 
lost on the contract ~with defendant's purchasers." 
(R-136 and R-137) (Emphasis added) 
This restrictive holding, defendant contends, was error, 
since there was competent and unimpeached evidence 
before the court from which he could and should haw 
''adjusted between the parties the difference between 
the value thereof." It was the testimony of l\fr. Claude 
Thompson as follows: 
"Q. And have efforts been made by you to re-
solve the matter in terms of replacement of car-
peting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you have any estimate at this time as 
to how much in the way of replacement is going 
to be needed? 
A. I would say 50 per cent of the units, or better. 
Q. And do you have any estimate as to what the 
cost of replacement is going to be, in terms of 
understanding there are 2,200 yards on the job. 
Half of that would be 1,100 yards. At what mini-
mum yard cost, your cost, would such a replace-
ment run in dollars and cents? 
A. Well, just something - even on the same basis 
as this, my cost would be in the neighborhood of 
five or six thousand dollars. I did ascertain some 
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of the labor involved in renewing and replacing 
new carpet. 
Q. Replacing the comparable quality? 
A. Even the comparable quality of this would be 
at least that much." (R-60) 
Cost of replacement of such carpeting forms a 
legitimate and competent element of damage, and 
evidence in that connection, was admitted as above 
noted. Such evidence, though it was an estimate, was 
not impeached and not contradicted. The current law 
in this area is well-enunciated in the case of Hoenstine v. 
Rose, 131 Montana 557, 312 Pac. 2nd 514, 517 (1957). 
That action was one for recovery for damages to a ve-
hicle where the vehicle in question had not, in fact, been 
repaired at the time of trial. The Montana Supreme 
Court there said : 
"It is not a condition precedent to recovery for 
items of damage necesesary to put plaintiff's 
wrecked vehicle in the condition it was before the 
accident that plaintiff should have first incurred 
an indebtedneess therefor or that he should have 
actually expended or paid the sum claimed in 
replacing or repairing the damaged parts. Cham-
bers v. Cunningham, 153 Okl. 129, 5 P. 2d 378, 
78 A. L. R. 905; Kincaid v. Dunn, 26 Cal. App. 
686, 148 P. 235, 236; Menefee v. Raisch Improve-
ment Co., 78 Cal. App. 785, 248 P. 1031, 1032; J. J. 
Clarke Co. v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., La. App. 
1945, 22 So. 2d 298, 300; Newman v. Brown, 228 
S. C. 472, 90 S.E. 2d 649, 635." 
Of similar import in a related area of medical bills 
as an element of damage, whether or not the same are 
paid, was ruled on m the California case of Broicn v. 
Guarantee Insurance Company, 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 
319 Pac. 2d 69, 66 A. L. R. 2d 1202 (1958). There the 
court quoted a -Wisconsin case of Schwartz v. N orwicli 
Union Indemnity Company, 212 Wisc. 593, 250 North 
West 446. 
"The court reasoned as follows (250NW at page 
446) : 'One who has been subjected to a judgment 
by reason of fraud practiced upon him by an-
other standing in the relation of insurer is entitled 
to relief even though he has not paid the judg-
ment. A cause of action in his favor arises and 
his damage occurs when the liability becomes 
thus fixed. Neither the right of action nor the 
maesure of damages depends upon the fact of 
payment.'' 
The record discloses considerable testimony of Mr. 
Claude Thompson as to specific defects in the merchan-
dise in the follo-wing testimony received both on direct 
and cross-examination. 
"Q. Have you had occasion to examine these two 
exhibits, "D-2" and "D-3"? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And would you be able to distinguish any dif-
ferences between the two? 
A. Yes, I would. 
Q. What would the difference be? 
A. I would say one would be about one-third light-
er than the other. 
THE CouRT: Let's say then, a difference, one 
will be of, say, yardage? 
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Q. (By MR. MADSEN) That is "D-2." 
A. '' D-2'' would feel to me about a third heavier 
than this one, which is '' D-3. '' 
Q. Any other distinguishing differences between 
the two1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is that¥ 
A. '' D-2 '' has a double scrim back on it, which is 
an advantage to a piece of carpet. 
Q. Have you heard, are you familiar with the 
phrase, what they call the ''Sunday sample?'' 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. What does that generically mean in the 
industry1 
A. A ''Sunday sample'' is ref erred to in the in-
dustry as a mill representative coming to you 
with a heavier sample, a fine piece of carpeting, 
and when you get the roll it is much lighter than 
represented. 
Q. Would you characterize the samples of the 
carpets that went into the United Homes, the rolls 
that went into United Homes, as opposed to the 
samples, as originally furnished, as that category? 
MR. HANSEN : Just a minute. Have you fin-
ished your question? 
MR. MADSEN : Yes. 
MR. HANSEN: We will object to it as self-serv-
ing, calling for a conclusion, and not the best 
evidence. 
MR. MADSEN: We have qualified him. It does 
call for a conclusion, your Honor. 
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1\fR. HANSEN: Object further on the grounds 
no proper fundation has been laid for opinion 
evidence. 
Q. (By 1\iR. MADSEN) 1\lr. Thompson, how long 
have you been in the carpeting business? 
A. Thirty-two years. 
Q. Have you had occasion to examine samples fur-
nished you hy mill representatives? 
A. Thousands of them. 
Q. And rolls of carpets subsequently furnished! 
A. Thousands of them. 
Q. Haye you had occasion to examine the samples 
furnished your company by G. & P. Sales? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have occasion to examine rolls of car-
pet subsequently furnished to you by G. & P. 
Sales? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have an opunon regarding the rep-
resentative quality of the samples as compared to 
the rolls of carpet furnished? You can answer 
that question ''Yes,'' or ''No.'' 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. That the rolls were not anywhere representa-
tive of the samples that were supplied us by G. & 
P. Sales. 
Q. Is that what is generally called in the trade a 
"Sunday sample?" 
A. Yes." (R-56-R-58) 
By way of explanation, it had previously been estab-
lished through the witness -William Thompson that Ex-
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hibit D-2 was a piece of carpet from the earlier rolls sup-
plied and Exhibit D-3 was a piece of carpet from the later 
rolls of carpet supplied by G. & P. (R-25) 
On cross-examination: 
"Q. Let's go to Exhibit "D-3." Is it your testi-
mony "D-3" is defective? 
A. Yes, sir. Any time, Mister, you can take a 
piece of carpet and do this to it, it is not very good 
(in di ca ting). 
Q. Tell me now what you mean by "D-3" as being 
defective. 
A. Being thinner than it was assured it would be, 
in construction. That it was not proper. There 
were voids and lines through it that should not 
have been there. They are still there, and you can 
see for yourself, Sir, if you don't believe me.'' 
R-67) 
And further: 
'' Q. You mentioned this was a defective carpet 
that we have here, ''Exhibit D-3.'' Would you 
tell us again, were the defects right in this par-
ticular carpet? 
A. In this particular carpet? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I could probably show you. There is a couple 
right through the woof. 
Q. Isn't that a result of something being torn out 
of it thougM 
A. I don't know. It is what happens that indi-
cates that it isn't put together very well, that type 
of broadloom. 
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Q. That is -vvithout the scrim 1 
A. It hasn't scrim, but it has rubber or latex that 
is supposed to hold it together." (R-74-R-75) 
The witness also, at some length, pointed out the 
difficulties and waste encountered by the odd-sized rolls 
of carpet received, by reason of the varying sized rolls 
furnished by G. & P. as follows: 
'' Q. You have testified, I believe, on the original 
direct. Well, excuse me. Let me strike that. I 
wanted to ask, you heard the testimony of your 
son relating to the size of the various rolls from 
being as high as 100 yards and from 30 yards. Is 
there any distinction about large rolls and small 
rolls in a job like this? 
A. Yes, indeed there is. 
Q. What is that. 
A. \:Vhere here we are laying a lot of rooms, in 
that case, carpet, the larger the roll the bigger the 
advantage. It requires lesser seams, fewer seams, 
and we can plan the cuts of the roll of carpet with 
literally not any waste. If rolls come in small, we 
accept a roll of 30 and 40 feet as a small roll, a 
partial roll. There is so much loss in laying a 
room, or any series of rooms. 
Q. What kind of cuts-
1\fR. HANSEN: I am going to object to this as 
being irrelevant to the issues of this case. There 
is no claim it wasn't properly cut, and that seems 
to be what his-
MR. MADSEN: We are getting around to the 
word "defective," and what our Pretrial Order is 
meant to cover. We indicate a loss. I presume, 
therefore, the manner in which it was produced 
and delivered, I presume the amounts in which 
24 
it was finished, I presume the caliber of each roll 
as it was produced is relevant or material. 
THE CouRT: I can see where some of this busi-
ness about the rolls might be proper, because 
everybody knows if rolls are coming from one 
plant or from another plant there might be a 
little variation in color. 
MR. MADSEN : Exactly, your Honorj and I think 
that is within the issues of this case as we have 
tried to define them. 
THE CouRT : Go ahead. 
Q. (By MR. MADSEN) Would you indicate what 
that occasions, therefore, when the rolls are 
shorter~ 
A. May I elaborate just a little bit on this? 
Q. Would you please? That is what I am asking. 
A. What this matter considered, to delegate the 
jobs to our installers, a job to oversee the cutting 
and the installation, and when we lay - when we 
come and lay out a job, if we were doing this room 
we would want as few seams in a broadloom roll 
as possible to make, and if we take a roll 30 feet 
long and this room would be 27 feet, and the least 
cut to fill out would not match that roll, dye-lot-
wise, there is a tremendous amount of waste. 
Q. Tell me, what do you mean by "dye-lot?" 
A. If we ordered this very patch today it would 
be ten shades off, your order. If it comes out the 
same shade, the amount of yarn, it is the same 
color, or if it doesn't it varies. 
Q. It varies? 
A. Unless it is the same dyelot it varies in color 
detail. 
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Q. When you have a number of small rolls as 
opposed to large rolls, the resulting match-
A. Yes, sir. 
Q . .May cause waste? 
A. It is difficult-" (R-83-R-84) 
In view of the fact that complaints on this carpet 
were timely conveyed, according to defendant's eYi-
dence, as early as December, 1962, (R-78-R-79) and ack-
nowledged by Witherell as having been received at lea~t 
by August 22, 1963 (R-98-R-99); and, in further view of 
the fact that plaintiff's assignor had been unwilling to 
admit any liability or defectiveness, notwithstanding 
his own expert witness admitting that the pilling ob-
served was a defect (R-128), the defendant-appellant 
should not be precluded from an off set solely for the rea-
son that it has not expended the estimated funds on re-
placement carpet herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
In all other particulars, the Facts and the Law of the 
J. Seal v. Carpets, Incorporated case cited above are 
controlling here. The defendant should be entitled to an 
offset which, under the evidence, far exceeds plaintiff's 
claim. The ruling of the trial court should accordingly 
be reversed with instructions that plaintiff's complaint 
be dismissed, no cause of action. In the alternative, the 
case should be remanded with the instructions that the 
court conduct a new trial allowing defendant to intro-
duce evidence not admitted as noted under point A above. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MABEY,RONNOW,MADSEN 
& MARSDEN 
57 4 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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